Defending Longinos Social Epistemology :: Science Scientific Philosophical Papers

Defending Longino's Social Epistemology (1) ABSTRACT: Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be a difficult task. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as social, for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called knowledge. In this paper, I explain Longino’s epistemology and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Kitcher, Schmitt and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the same (adverse) effect on inquiry. She also recommends that we reconceptualize ‘knowledge,’ distinguishing knowledge from opinion by reference to a social standard. Though it is agreed that epistemologists need to account for the role social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be a difficult task. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are social, requiring a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called "knowledge." Here, I want to both explain and defend Longino's epistemology. I Longino defines her account of scientific knowledge relative to positivist and wholist accounts. Though many regard positivism as offering an untenable account of science, because "no comparable sweeping and detailed philosophical view has replaced it," Longino believes that it still needs to be reckoned with (L1990, 21). Wholists are significant because they have been the greatest critics of positivism. After presenting these accounts, and explaining the difficulties that Longino has with them, I will present Longino's own account of scientific knowledge and inquiry. This discussion focuses on two issues: the relationship between evidence and hypotheses; and, the role of "contextual" values in inquiry. Longino contrasts contextual values with constitutive values. The latter, the "values generated from an understanding of the goals of scientific inquiry," "are the source of the rules determining what constitutes acceptable scientific practice or scientific method" (L1990, 4). That these values influence inquiry is not a problem. But the former, "personal, social, and cultural values," are thought to threaten the integrity of scientific inquiry (L1990, 4-5). According to positivists, "the fundamental base of inquiry, the source of confirming or disconfirming instances, is a set of .